Internationalizing the Kurdish Question
Text and photos by Onnik Krikorian

The Kurds in Armenia

After the Muslim Kurdish population left Armenia with the republic's Azeri minority at the beginning of the Karabagh conflict, the only Kurds that remain are the Yezidi. With a historic animosity between Muslim Kurds and Christian Armenians - stemming from Kurdish involvement in the 1915 Genocide of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire - it may seem that there are few reasons for the Yezidi to identify with a political force such as the PKK. Indeed, the Yezidi - apart from a few cases of discrimination reported by the US State Department - have been allowed to live mainly in rural communities free from any form of persecution. Problems that have arisen in the community have largely been as a result of the inability of the Armenian government to provide for its entire population, Armenian and Yezidi alike.

However, as a political force the PKK has taken upon itself the responsibility of carrying the national liberation movement to Kurdish communities across the globe, and Armenia, because it borders Turkey, is seen of some importance. During Ocalan's trial it was admitted that some financial assistance for the guerillas in Turkey had come from Yezidi living in Armenia, and it is already known that some Yezidi have volunteered to join the ranks of the military wing of the PKK - the ARGK - in Turkey.

The spreading of Kurdish nationalism throughout an already volatile region is all the more impetus for the West to encourage a reasoned political dialogue to resolve a problem that could ignite tension and instability not only in Europe but also in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East.

Indeed, this warning even formed part of Ocalan's defense: "The other factor that might serve to widen the armed conflict is the Kurdish population of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus - and in fact all over the world. These scattered people might unite, and the PKK has [already] achieved this unity to an important extent. This is a new development that deserves examination. There are the conditions to benefit from all these areas and people in terms of logistics, manpower, financial resources and relations," Ocalan stated.

"The traditional contradictions between Turkey and the Turkic republics, [and] some Caucasus and Balkan countries might develop further, and the anti-Turkey politics of Armenia, Serbia, or Cyprus might develop in the short run and naturally seek to use the PKK and thus be in a position to escalate the war. The continual development of interests and relations is inevitable and will accelerate logistical and technical supply."

Kurdish identity in Armenia

In Armenia, the Yezidi community is divided, and this division can be seen to have occurred for a variety of reasons. At the beginning of the Karabagh conflict it is almost certain that by distancing themselves from the Muslim Kurds, the Yezidi managed to escape the tit-for-tat expulsions and migrations that defined the beginning of the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Armenian operations in the mainly Muslim Kurdish regions of Kelbajar and Lachin (the region between Karabagh and Armenia known as "Red Kurdistan" during the 1920s) would have made such a desire even more likely as the war progressed.

However, with the cease-fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan still holding - and far from the minds of a new generation of Armenians - there are few reasons for the Yezidi to isolate themselves from the Kurdish nation at the present time. That is, apart from one: In Europe, Turkey, and elsewhere, the term "Kurd" has now become a political label, indicating support for Kurdish nationalism and - perhaps - support for the Kurdish national liberation movement in the form of the PKK.

The sensitivities of a PKK presence in Armenia are well known to a certain section of the Yezidi population in Armenia, and attempts to deny any form of relationship with the Kurdish nation are prolific and exaggerated. Despite sharing the same language - Kurmanji - as the majority of Kurds, those Yezidi that seek to distance themselves appear to be rewriting and redefining their identity. They are doing so even if they risk isolating themselves from those Yezidi outside of Armenia who acknowledge their Kurdish roots but point to differences in their religion.

Jamal Sadakhyan, Chairman of the Public Organization of the International federation of Yezidi in Armenia, recently wrote that "there is a common belief that the Yezidi and the Kurds are from the same nation. This belief is groundless - the Yezidi are a unique and separate nation with its own language [Ezdiki], religion, habits, and peculiarities. To identify the Yezidi with another nation is to unreasonably deny the existence of a nation that has been firmly established for centuries."

There is, however, no doubt that the language of the Yezidi is Kurmanji - a Kurdish dialect spoken by most of the Kurds in Turkey - and that two days after the Ocalan verdict, thousands of Kurds demonstrated outside the US Embassy in Yerevan before marching through the center of the city to continue their protest outside the offices of the United Nations.

If there are no Muslim Kurds in Armenia, and if the Yezidi are not Kurds, who exactly were these protesters and why were they protesting? Likewise, if Sadakhyan thinks himself to be representative of the Yezidi in the republic, whom exactly is he representing?

Professor Philip G. Kreyenbroek, a specialist on the Kurds and Yezidi of Turkey and Northern Iraq, addresses this issue:

In recent times a complicating factor seems to have been the lure of PKK ideology, which attracts some Armenian Yezidis as it does many others. As the PKK stresses that Kurdish identity takes precedence over religious affiliations, those that are influenced by it naturally go back to calling themselves Kurds.

On the other hand, more traditional groups feel threatened by this and deny the connection between Kurds and Yezidis all the more strongly. To a lesser extent the same developments can be seen in Germany, where dislike of the PKK causes some Yezidis to play down their Kurdish identity, stressing the Yezidi aspect.

A community is naturally free to define its identity as it chooses, but still the Armenian Yezidi view is not easy to maintain. The Yezidi religious and cultural tradition is deeply rooted in Kurdish culture - almost all Yezidi's sacred texts are in Kurdish, the language all Yezidi communities have is common is Kurdish - and most other Yezidi communities consider themselves to be Kurds - though often with some reservations.

Ironically, even the Yezidi in neighboring Georgia openly admit their dual identity; the Kurdish representative in the Georgian Parliament is himself a Yezidi. This perhaps indicates that the recent history of the Armenian nation - and its present day identity - is still shaped by the defining factor of Kurdish involvement in the Armenian Genocide. It also creates a serious problem for the Yezidi minority in Armenia as a result of the Ocalan trial - and as a result of Kosovo.

National minorities in the Caucasus

After Kosovo there is now a particular interest in examining the rights of national minorities in the Caucasus, and there are already two non-governmental organizations starting to look into the situation in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia - Caucasus LINKS and the British Helsinki Human Rights Group. Although it is doubtful that the minorities in the Republic of Armenia will be of a greater interest to the West than the conflict arising out of ethnic and minority hostility in Abkhazia and Karabagh, there is one concern that has to be raised with regards to the situation of the largest minority in the Armenian republic.

The Yezidi community numbers between 50,000 and 60,000, and the extent of the division as to its identity is unknown. With a Presidential Commission on National Minorities and Human Rights in place, and a draft law on minorities being written, it seems unlikely that minorities in the Republic can be properly represented under national and international law if no one can identify the number of Yezidi on each side of the divide, and who can truly state that they represent them.

One side of the community declares that there are 50,000 Yezidi in the republic - the other that there are 50,000 Kurds. In reality, those 50,000 are the same, and as the experience in Turkey has shown, denial of identity can lead to a politicization that sees radical forces such as the PKK become an attractive option.

The Yezidi - whom the Armenian population considers farmers and peasants - can now feel some form of self-worth in an identification with the Kurdish movement after the media coverage surrounding the trial of Ocalan, the Kurdish Question, and the increasing reference in the international media that their activities are being staged in support of Ocalan as part of a 50,000-strong Kurdish population in Armenia.

The Kurds may well become a significant political force in the Caucasus in the near future, and if the PKK does adopt a new (truly) terrorist campaign, the government of Armenia may well find itself accused of supporting and encouraging terrorist activities in neighboring Turkey.

Whether Ocalan truly represented a genuine struggle for the rights of the Kurds in Turkey is now an irrelevance. Directly or indirectly, the PKK managed to achieve significant goals in its conflict with the Turkish state. Kurds can now speak their own language in public and are identified by senior members of the Turkish government as an ethnic minority living within the borders of the Turkish republic. They are also becoming a cohesive and coordinated force - with an influence stretching from Europe to the Caucasus.

Regardless, and as the world debates the outcome of the Ocalan trial, the rights of national minorities throughout the world are now high on the list of priorities for a new international agenda.

After Kosovo it can be no other way.

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