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Internationalizing the
Kurdish Question
Text and photos by Onnik Krikorian
With this ruling Turkey has ignored the call
by the Kurdish people for a peaceful solution to the war, and an end
to the bloodshed. It will pave a new and dangerous road for conflict
- in Turkey and the Middle East.
National Liberation
Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) Statement, 29 June, Vienna
The Trial of Abdullah Ocalan
On 29 June 1999, a Turkish Court convicted and
sentenced to death the President of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
Abdullah Ocalan. After 15 years of Kurdish separatism, Turkey could finally
celebrate what it believes to be an end to a movement that has proven
both a major threat to its internal stability and an extreme embarrassment
in its relations abroad.
Turkey has been plagued by report after report highlighting
human rights violations by the Turkish security services; now, any analysis
of the Kurdish question must be examined in the context of Kosovo - and
Western policy in support of the rights of a people to self-determination.
As a result, the next few months, and perhaps years, may prove to be the
most significant period in the history of the Kurdish movement - and similar
movements elsewhere. Rather than having defeated a separatist threat,
Turkey now risks igniting a new more volatile situation, further alienating
its Kurdish minority.
In light of Kosovo - and Western support for the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) - there is now less ground than ever to condemn
the PKK as a terrorist movement; moreover, a precedent exists by which
to challenge Turkey's record on human rights in the international community.
Unless significant concessions for the Kurds in Turkey are forthcoming,
there may now be serious problems for the republic's immediate future
that will threaten the stability of those countries on its borders and
initiate a new wave of Kurdish terrorism.
Turkey's "Kurdish problem" has been defined
not only by the activities of the PKK but also by a Turkish policy that
has resulted in hundreds of cases of "disappearances," extra-judicial
killings, and the destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages in the
southeast of the country. The "dirty war" for which Turkey has
tried, convicted, and sentenced Ocalan has largely been one of its own
making. The Turkish military has proven itself to be just as guilty -
if not more so - as those Kurds who have reacted against a life of economic
disadvantage and discrimination by identifying a feeling of self-worth
and identity in the form of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the Kurdish
national liberation movement.
Even if a death sentence is commuted to a life sentence,
Ocalan's imprisonment may simply prove to be yet another thorn in the
side of a nation that has already imprisoned a more moderate Kurdish voice
- Leyla Zana. On the other hand, execution will result in an unprecedented
backlash that will weaken the country as never before. Opposed to such
an outcome, the Council of Europe has already warned the Turkish government
of the consequences that may follow if Ocalan is hanged. Indeed, many
European and Turkish analysts, politicians, and organizations are warning
of the potential for an escalation in PKK terrorist activity.
The new leader of the PKK - Cemil Bayik -has also
warned of an "unprecedented campaign of violence if Ocalan is executed."
Although Ocalan may have been the central figure behind the PKK, even
without his leadership the command structure of the organization remains;
furthermore, faced with the reality that attempts to wage a successful
guerilla war have failed, the PKK may see it more advantageous to instead
embark upon a campaign of terrorism that it has so far been reluctant
to follow. The main force behind that reluctance was Ocalan, and now that
attempts to engage in a reasoned political dialogue have been rejected
by Turkey, it will prove disastrous for Turkish state to create a martyr
out of a figure that publicly declared he was willing to work for peace.
Turkey should also remember that to date the PKK
has not engaged in the sort of terrorist activity that afflicted it at
the hands of organizations such as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation
of Armenia and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide in the late
seventies and early eighties. It should also remember that Kosovo is still
fresh in the consciousness of the Western media. The Kurds - and the PKK
- will now be looking for the same sort of concern in any Western policy
regarding their situation. The scenes from Kosovo that were broadcast
around the world are not too dissimilar from those that have been witnessed
in the Kurdish regions of Turkey.
US policy and Kosovo
After a US-driven policy in support of the Albanians
in Yugoslavia - and with parallels already being drawn between Kosovo
and the Kurds - the West may find itself already discredited and its integrity
in doubt. As a result of Kurdish suspicions that there was an Israeli-American-Turkish
axis involved in Ocalan's abduction from Kenya, the US government has
already stepped up security at its representations and missions abroad.
After a decade of arming Turkey in its fight against its own population,
the United States must now be concerned with the risk of US military and
political installations in Western Europe being targeted.
Certainly, in Armenia the hostility among the hundreds
of Yezidi Kurds who demonstrated outside the United States Embassy two
days after the Ocalan verdict was far stronger than that exhibited outside
of the United Nations offices. Largely peaceful demonstrations elsewhere
in the world, however, hide a reality that as the date of any execution
nears, tempers and actions may get more extreme.
With little sign of any form of Kurdish reprisals
so far, it may simply be that the Kurds are waiting for the process of
appeal to end. Kurdish activities over the coming days and months are
just as likely to affect the outcome of any appeal and the attitude of
the Western media as any debate within Turkey.
Politically, Turkey stands to lose more in the form
of its international reputation than the Kurds, but there is also a possibility
that small-scale demonstrations of power may remind Turkey and the United
States that the Kurdish Question still remains unanswered, and that the
implications for Turkey are great if it does not adopt a more rational
policy towards a sizable minority. It may also prove to define Kurdish
populations abroad as a more radical force than ever before, and in Armenia
this is already proving the case.
continues...
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