An Interview with Thomas de Waal
Institute of War & Peace Reporting

OK: Let’s turn to the peace process. Researching your book happened to coincide with various new endeavours to resolve the Karabagh conflict and you even crossed the contact line with the OSCE mediators last year. After 11 September, do you think that there’s a new move by the US to find a solution to the Karabagh conflict?

TDW: I don’t actually. Basically, the Americans and the Russians have been working quite closely on this issue for the past two or three years. September 11 actually drew them closer together on other issues but on Karabagh they had already been cooperating.

Russia had been meddling, interfering and being difficult on the issue until 1998 but now it does not stand in the way of a settlement. Maybe there are some in the Russian military that would still like to obstruct the process, but the politicians want to see it resolved.

In a way, maybe the two conflicting sides are very lucky to have America, Russia and France so actively involved. The problem is that the internal pressures against a settlement are far greater than anything external.

Resolution of the conflict is something you just can’t impose because public opinion is still largely sceptical of an agreement. The two leaderships are too cautious and cynical to start talking peace when they can continue with the language of nationalism and propaganda.

That’s particularly true in Azerbaijan where the political process is now getting used to the idea of the end of the Aliyev regime. Last year, Russia, America and France were pushing very hard and so you can’t chide them with not being interested in peace. However, it all came to nothing when the two presidents started to consult with other political forces when they returned from Key West.

They just didn’t really have it in them to make the big push within their own societies for a peace settlement. Having not done that last year, we’re now entering a new political cycle where both leaders are more vulnerable. Presidential elections are coming up in the next year or two, and probably a change of regime in Azerbaijan.

Basically, I think that the whole thing is off the agenda for the next three or four years.

OK: Although this is going off the topic of your book, when we speak about Russian and US friendship after 11 September, the Americans do seem to have ruffled a few feathers with an increased presence in the Caucasus. When we spoke about this recently, you suggested that any disagreements might emerge over Georgia rather than Karabagh.

The Americans have already established a small military presence in Georgia, and it could be argued that an even smaller presence has been established in Armenia with the opening of the demining center in Etchmiadzin. Azerbaijan also appears very eager to attract the United States into its territory.

TDW: There are several issues here. I think that Georgia is quite distinct in some ways from Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Russia, it is much more strategically important because they share a border, and Georgia is right next door to Chechnya.

There are Russian bases there, and Abkhazia is an issue that the Russian military cares a lot about. There’s also the issue of Shevardnadze which is one of the few issues that polarizes the Russians and Americans.

For many in America and also Germany, Shevardnadze can do no wrong. They like him for what he did at the end of the cold war and there are quite a few people in Moscow that dislike him for precisely the same reasons. That’s polarized the Russians and the Americans in such a way that they can’t really work together in Georgia.

The arrival of American military advisors in the Pankisi Gorge is a classic example of Russian and American ambitions particular to Georgia which I think is rather unhealthy and perhaps even childish. I think that in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Russians and the Americans can actually get along fine.

OK: However, there is talk of US military assistance to Azerbaijan being spent on improving its naval capacity. The argument being put forward is that it’s a way to prevent possible confrontations with Iran in the Caspian. This suggests that there is an attempt to extend American influence in the Caucasus. Something seems to be afoot.

TDW: I think that there’s possibly something afoot after 11 September because Washington now thinks that they have carte blanche to do what they like. They’ve been acting with this breathtaking self-confidence, which some would call arrogance, all over the place.

However, because the strategic military alliance between Armenia and Russia is so strong, and because the Armenian economy is incredibly dependent on Russia, there’s no way that Armenia is going to turn its back on Russia.

The United States has its own interests in Armenia through the Diaspora and so on, and I think the two can get along fine. The same is true in Azerbaijan. There’s a thaw in relations between Aliyev and Putin, and Azerbaijan is quite strongly pro-American.

With Iran, there could be a problem but I think that the Americans understand that both Armenia and Azerbaijan will have to deal with Iran given that it’s their neighbour. I also think that there are many people in Washington who would like to deal with Iran and they thought that the moment had come after 11 September. However, it was taken away from them when Bush made his State of the Union address.

OK: Let’s come back to the Karabagh negotiations. Many people in the Diaspora don’t seem to think that there is conflict anymore. Therefore, this is peace. Why can’t it be like this?

TDW: You just have to visit Azerbaijan to realize that there are a lot of people who lost their homes in the Karabagh conflict. If we forget about those who left in the pre-soviet period, there are around half a million people who lost their homes in Karabagh and the seven regions surrounding it.

Some have assimilated into society and others have left for abroad, but an awful lot of them are living in very miserable conditions, either in tents or in schools, hostels and makeshift accommodation. You can argue that the Azerbaijani government is artificially keeping them there but in a sense, that’s missing the point.

These people have homes that they want to return to. Azerbaijan is a wounded nation and Armenians should really take that into account. These wounds won’t heal and in order to deal with Azerbaijan in the future you have to understand that.

We’re talking about several generations of people who lived in one place, went to work, their children went to school, and they were driven out of their homes. It would be unreasonable to expect them to be reconciled to that situation.

It’s one thing about how you go about negotiations, but there are blind spots on both sides. Azerbaijan fails to understand the security and cultural concerns of Armenians living in Karabagh and Armenians tend to forget the hundreds of thousands of Azeris that fled their homes.

OK: Some elderly refugees living in Armenia still hope to return to Baku although some would argue that it’s crazy for anyone to return to what might be a volatile situation. However, what we’re talking about is refugees having the right to return if they want to, isn’t it?

TDW: I think that it’s unrealistic to expect Armenians to return to Azerbaijan or the Azerbaijanis to return to Armenia. Both nations have filled the gap since they left, and certainly filled the houses. However, the right to return is more enforceable when we’re talking about people in and around Karabagh, and that also refers to Armenians from the Shahumian region.

I don’t think that anyone in Armenia expects to hold on to places like Fizuli, Aghdam and Jebrail. In every attempt at a settlement since 1994, these areas were negotiable and so yes, these people will have the right to return. The problem is that their homes are now completely levelled and even if they do get the opportunity, it might take ten or twenty years before they do actually return.

OK: A phased approach for settling of the conflict has been mentioned on numerous occasions, although the Armenian side still favours a package agreement. This would include the return of some territory and the necessity to build up trust between the conflicting parties.

In a sense, I’ve begun to suspect that it’s already started with more international money being made available for confidence building measures. There’s more interaction between Armenian and Azerbaijani journalists, and politicians from both sides are visiting each other.

Another key area where people talk about everyone having something in common is business. It will be a very long process, but has it already started?

TDW: I think that it has started but that the signs are pretty discouraging in the sense that the media in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and particularly the latter, is still very intolerant. In Azerbaijan, there are some very aggressive calls for the liberation of Karabagh and the prosecution of Kocharian for war crimes.

There’s also concern in Azerbaijan that any contact with the Armenians might stabilize the status quo, but with regards to the issue of a phased agreement, I was speaking to Arkhady Ghukasian about this only yesterday. His response was simply that he had no confidence in Azerbaijan and that it was inconvenient to undermine Karabagh’s security by redrawing the frontline when nobody knows where it will lead.

I think that this is a circular argument and that both sides need to make a courageous step towards each other. While I can understand the scepticism, you have to start somewhere and it needn’t be that risky. You could, for example, open the road between Armenia and Nakhichevan, which is suffering more than Armenia. Nakhichevan talks about the blockade but in their case, it’s a blockade by Armenia.

If you opened up that road it would benefit both sides and then perhaps, a few Azeri villages on the frontline could be given back as a gesture of goodwill. We’re talking about something very small on the ground which would breathe a bit of life into the peace process and encourage a small amount of trust.

I met the mayor of Nakhichevan who used to go to Yerevan rather than Baku in order to fly to Moscow during the soviet years. He was one of the few Azerbaijani officials who spoke openly about the peace process because it would directly benefit Nakhichevan.

OK: While you were researching of your book, you made friends on all sides of the conflict. In that context, are you depressed or optimistic about the future?

TDW: I do feel depressed in that I don’t really see a way out, and although many people do want to see a settlement, they still don’t really understand the need to compromise. They instead tend to talk about victory rather than peace.

They want a way out but they’re still rather naive about it. However, I don’t necessarily blame them because there is the complete lack of public debate in society about what is realistic. On the other hand, and I constantly make this point, you can speak to one person and hear many contradictory views.

You can listen to one person speaking triumphantly or angrily about their land being taken by the Armenians, or the liberation of territory from the Azerbaijanis, but then they speak about their friends on the other side. They speak about the need for trade and business, and how they meet their friend Ashot or Aziz whenever they visit Moscow.

So, there are all sorts of layers of reaction in the same people and I think it’s important to keep those memories alive. While those aspects of humanity are still there, there’s still hope.

OK: I think that your book will make interesting reading. When can we expect it?

TDW: I’m speaking to my publishers, New York University Press, at the moment and while I’d like it to come out tomorrow, it’s likely to be published towards the end of the year or at the beginning of 2003.

First Published on the Armenian News Network - Groong, 2002

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