The Rose Revolution: One Year Later
The view from inside the South Caucasus

by Onnik Krikorian

YEREVAN, Armenia -- As similar events unfold in Ukraine, the anniversary of the "Rose Revolution" that eventually brought Mikhail Saakashvili to power in Georgia has naturally prompted many analysts to consider whether its outcome is still treated as positively inside the republic as it is outside. According to most western media reports, at least, international support for the new Georgian president remains high.

Most noticeable for many foreign visitors that had previously visited the country, a new traffic police no longer "shake down" passing motorists and the infrastructure in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, appears to be improving. The state budget has increased and arrears for pensions and state-dispensed salaries are being settled. A much-publicized crackdown on high-level corruption has also won the young president significant popular support.

Others, however, express concern at the unorthodox and sometimes unconstitutional methods employed, alleging that rather than represent a genuine struggle against corruption and abuse of power, the crackdown is politically expedient in that it mainly targets former officials and businessmen close to the previous regime. More significantly, perhaps, critics have emerged inside Saakashvili's own camp.

Activists, who used to represent a vibrant civil society that was once the envy of its neighbors, have taken up positions in the new administration but there are concerns that a void has been left in their place. Unfortunately, critics argue, the same mechanisms that brought Saakashvili to power now no longer exist to ensure that the long and difficult task of democratization can continue.

Nevertheless, recent opinion polls show that Saakashvili can still count on the support of the majority of Georgians although as much as 30% of the population considers that the country is now heading in the wrong direction. Nine months earlier, however, that figure stood at just 5%. In part, perhaps, this growing dissatisfaction is the result of overly high expectations inadvertently encouraged last November.

"Sooner or later, the revolutionary phase will pass and depending on how real declarations were, either the public will be patient for a little longer or become very quickly disappointed," says Laura Baghdasarian, Director of the Investigative Journalists of Armenia's "Region" Center in Yerevan. According to Baghdasarian, Saakashvili's predecessor also came to power on a wave of popular support but initial hopes soon turned sour.

As a result, some analysts argue that the November 2003 events were not everything they were initially thought to be. "The "Rose Revolution" was not a revolution in the classical sense," says Giro Manoyan of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaksutiune's International Secretariat. "The people did not win but rather, a group in the authority itself came to power."

"The same foreign circles that welcomed dynastic succession in Azerbaijan are supporting the present Georgian government," argues Manoyan. "This is not because Georgia is the proclaimed bastion of democracy in the region but because of the geopolitical and economic interests that these powers have and the role the current authorities are willing to play in furthering those interests."

"Dependence on foreign aid is unfortunate," admits Ghia Nodia, Director of the Institute of Peace, Democracy and Development in Georgia, "but there is not much difference in this respect between Saakashvili and Shevardnadze or indeed, between Georgia and Armenia for that matter. The people win when politicians they prefer come to power -- what other definition [of democracy] is there?"

And Dr. Jonathan Wheatley, a Researcher at Berlin University, at least confirms that positive changes have occurred since Saakashvili came to power but also sounds a note of caution. "While these steps are modest," he says, "they have halted years of relentless degradation. However, while improvements can be felt in the Georgian capital, most observers will tell you that nothing has changed at all in the regions."

Indeed, he says, while young and sometimes inexperienced reformers have been appointed to positions of power, there are still "many local administrators that belong to the same old networks dating from Shevardnadze's period as President or even further back to the soviet era albeit now sporting the colors of [Saakashvili's] National Movement with the same zeal as they previously donned the garb of the Communist Party."

Therefore, Wheatley says that key to the future viability of Georgia as a state "with at least the basic attributes of democracy and the rule of law" is decentralization. "Unfortunately," he concludes, "the new government has so far proved unwilling to dismantle the old over-centralized system and in some respects has reinforced it, especially in its dealings with Ajaria, where the head of the autonomous republic is little more than a presidential appointee."

And it is the new president's policy towards Georgia 's breakaway regions that causes the most concern.

"Saakashvili is determined to restore the authority of Tbilisi over two separatist Georgian regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia," says Aflatun Amashov, Chairman of the Press Council of Azerbaijan. "Probably, he will get support from his overseas partners but it's going to be difficult. Attempts to repeat the Ajarian experiment in South Ossetia this summer failed and the confronting parties came to the brink of full-scale armed conflict."

According to Amashov, Georgia needs western support to settle these outstanding conflicts and as the United States has promised their assistance when the opportunity arises, US-Russian tensions will increase in the region as a result, thus affecting Georgia 's neighbors. "Saakashvili is selfishly concerned only about Georgian interests, despite the fact that the Caucasus is an indivisible organism." he says.

"Georgia is now on the brink of a new escalation in South Ossetia and what is more dangerous, in Abkhazia," says Paata Gurgenidze of the Institute of Peace, Democracy and Development in Georgia. "Every day Georgian TV praises our army and declares that they are ready to regain lost territories while Saakashvili says that ‘although we don't want a war, we are ready for it and we will achieve our goals.' This is the typical language of escalation."

"However," he continues, "I believe that we can't reunify Georgia with force and it would better to agree on common goals and common enemies just as the Swiss did while establishing their confederate state."

And it is these concerns that make the weakening of civil society and the independent media in Georgia unfortunate.

"At the moment, the lack of a developed check and balances system and a shortage in qualified personnel in all branches of power creates a dangerous situation for Georgia," says Alish Gasymov of the Congress of Azerbaijanis of Russia. "Today, one man has excessively wide authority and therefore, erroneous political decisions may result in grave outcomes."

"Democratic values are not just about conducting elections that ensure the sovereignty of people," he continues, "but also about the protection of property, political accountability, judicial procedures and the rule of law. We should not forget that these are political institutions and not just the endeavors of individual persons. In the end, Saakashvili will have to sacrifice his power for the sake of democracy. Of course, if he really wants it."

Ghia Nodia, however, says that Saakashvili's approach and tendency towards "populist authoritarianism" is simply expedient and perhaps the only way to modernize and democratize Georgian society. "The dominant ideology of this government is pro-Western modernization which also means liberal ideas but they see the 'backward' or 'traditionalist' instincts of the people as the main impediment to this," he explains.

"They want to carry out liberal reforms through at least partly autocratic mechanisms because they are fearful that genuine participation will make this less likely," he says. "At the same time, however, they are afraid of some kind of anti-Western reaction and therefore use rhetoric that sounds rather illiberal. This rhetoric is in part caused by Saakashvili's instincts but also by political calculation. Of course, this is a dangerous game."

But Marina Muskhelishvili from the Center for Public Research in Georgia says that the "Rose Revolution" was never about democracy anyway. Instead, she argues, the "authoritarian modernization of society" was the main objective of the "Rose Revolution." She also believes that that this is why many of those who initially supported the triumvirate of Mikhail Saakashvili, Nina Burdjanadze and Zurab Zhvania are now unhappy and critical of the new administration and of current developments in Georgia.

"It was Saakashvili who won," she says, "and it was his choice and his decision to shift from these people to the more numerous traditionalist strata of the population. He changed his political discourse or, rather, tries to combine the two. His former revolutionaries are now trying to get him back to their original discourse but such attempts are very naive."

"It is absolutely clear, as the Ukrainian example shows, that discussions about revolutions and democracy make no sense without putting them in the context of globalization," she continues. "The population was very unhappy with Shevardnadze and now has more active, energetic and youthful leaders but while this is good news in the sense of modernization and globalization, what about democracy?"

In Muskhelishvili's opinion, democracy is also about changing governments regularly and society having political influence and participation in policy making. In this context, Muskhelishvili argues that nothing much has changed at all.

Nevertheless, Stepan Grigorian, Director of the Center of Globalization and Regional Cooperation in Armenia, says that whatever the reality on the ground, the "Rose Revolution" was the most significant development in the entire Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in recent years. The only possible exception, he considers, would be if Viktor Yushchenko were to come to power in Ukraine.

"The Rose Revolution in Georgia has shown that there is the possibility for the peaceful change of governments and that those elected by the people can come to power," he says."Georgia has taken the role of locomotive for the integration of the South Caucasus into the European Union and NATO. The process which took place in Georgia now provides the opportunity for the democratization of the entire region."

But, he adds, key to the success of any knock-on effect in terms of democratization and modernization in Armenia and Azerbaijan depends on the support and involvement of foreign powers, a reality that Laura Baghdasarian also recognizes.

"The suspicion that whatever happened in Georgia wasn't simply the result of internal processes confirms the theory that any change of government in this region has no connection will the will of the people but that it must instead fit in with the interests of outside powers," she says, highlighting the example of opposition protests held in Yerevan during the spring.

"The forces that were struggling for power in Armenia were not supported by either Russia or the US," she says. "Yet, had the desire for change in Armenia somehow corresponded with their interests, we would have had our own revolution or change of power under the name of another flower or plant. This phenomenon makes it impossible to achieve any progress in the region."

But whatever the reasons for, and problems with, the "Rose Revolution," it is obvious that all three republics face similar problems. What makes Georgia different, perhaps, is that less than a year after Saakashvili's inauguration, Georgia still has the opportunity to break free from the vicious cycle of authoritarian rule, corruption and human rights abuses that afflicts the entire region. What remains to be seen, however, is whether it will.

And the answer to that question will probably not be known for another year. It will also be as much dependent on the willingness of the West to insist on the establishment of genuine democratic institutions over individual power as any internal desire for change. If it fails, however, the window of opportunity for the democratization of the South Caucasus and other former soviet republics may be lost.

"The Georgian people supported revolution and other neighboring countries have similar hopes as well," says Muskhelishvili. "Whether we are optimistic or pessimistic about the current Georgian government is of no matter. There were many messages from our friends in other countries who wanted to learn positive lessons from our experience. I hope that we did not disappoint them."

First Published by Hetq Online, 2004.